CISA Red Team Operations
Introduction
In a series of red team assessments, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) demonstrated how even well-defended organizations can be breached—and how attackers often go undetected for weeks or months.
These assessments reveal a critical truth: attackers don’t need zero-days or advanced malware to succeed. They rely on predictable infrastructure and behaviors—beaconing, tunneling, new domains, and unauthorized lateral movement.
This article walks through three real-world CISA red team operations, showing how AlphaSOC would have detected each stage using behavioral network analytics and real-time telemetry.
Scenario 1: SILENTSHIELD
The red team exploited an Oracle vulnerability to deploy a Python-based RAT. Using redirectors and domain fronting, they established C2 over HTTPS, then moved laterally via SSH tunnels and cron-based persistence.
How AlphaSOC Would Have Detected It
- Traffic to a young domain impersonating a known brand (
impostersuspiciousyoung) would detect attacker-controlled infrastructure used in phishing or C2. - Beaconing to suspicious domains (
suspiciousdomainbeacon) would reveal the Python RAT’s periodic HTTP/S callbacks. - Outbound SSH session using an uncommon server port (
ssh_uncommon) would surface SSH tunnels over non-standard ports like TCP 443. - Anonymizing circuit traffic (
anon_circuit) would detect redirector chains or hidden infrastructure.
These detections correlate across timing, domain age, protocol usage, and behavioral anomalies—surfacing threats even without file-level indicators.
Scenario 2: Compromise of a Critical Infrastructure Organization
CISA’s red team used spearphishing to compromise hosts, escalated privileges via unconstrained delegation, and moved laterally through SCCM infrastructure and internal shares.
How AlphaSOC Would Have Detected It
- Traffic to a suspicious domain (
suspiciousdomainbeacon) would catch the phishing infrastructure and payload delivery. - Outbound HTTP POSTs to suspicious destinations (
httppostsuspicious) would flag the initial implant callbacks. - Outbound traffic over SMB requiring investigation (
smb_outbound) would detect lateral movement via admin shares. - Outbound SSH session using an uncommon server port (
ssh_uncommon) and anonymizing circuit traffic (anon_circuit) would again surface stealthy backdoors. - Audit activity from a previously unseen country (
audit_unseen_country_unique) would alert on abnormal geolocation activity from compromised hosts.
This scenario highlights AlphaSOC’s ability to surface stealthy pivoting, credential abuse, and remote management abuse.
Scenario 3: MDM Abuse and Cloud-Based Persistence
In this assessment, the red team compromised an MDM platform, elevated privileges, and pushed payloads to SBS-connected workstations. They used HTTPS redirectors and SSH socket hijacking for stealthy C2.
How AlphaSOC Would Have Detected It
- Traffic to a young domain impersonating a known brand (
impostersuspiciousyoung) and spearphishing traffic (spearphishing_traffic) would identify early infrastructure. - Beaconing to suspicious domains (
suspiciousdomainbeacon) would catch long-lived C2 connections to redirectors. - Audit activity from a previously unseen country (
audit_unseen_country_unique) would reveal stealthy use of under-monitored geographies for infrastructure. - Outbound SSH session using an uncommon server port (
ssh_uncommon) would detect stealthy interactive sessions between compromised systems.
Together, these detections give defenders visibility into custom tooling, misused admin controls, and adversary infrastructure.
Final Thoughts
AlphaSOC doesn’t rely on malware signatures or sandboxing. It identifies threats based on how attackers behave on the wire. Whether it’s a rare domain, protocol misuse, or subtle beaconing pattern, AlphaSOC turns noisy logs into actionable detections—before attackers reach their objectives.
For defenders facing stealthy red teams or real adversaries, that early signal makes all the difference.